1930 Technocracy, Eugenics & Transhumanism

Technocracy, Eugenics and Transhumanism. Study - Mtrl.

Historical reflections. The War against Humanity.

Technocracy is an expert-based type of governance. In its strongest sense, it is a form of government in which decisions across all sectors and policy domains follow evidence-based, efficiency-oriented procedures grounded in scientific methods and instrumental rationality. In a weaker sense, the term refers to hybrid models that delegate specific functions to experts or implement expertise-driven decision procedures in areas such as central banking, public health, or environmental regulation.

Technocracy is often regarded as a challenge to democracy since it grounds political legitimacy in elite expertise, while democracy justifies itself as the rule of the people. One approach to resolving their tensions suggests that democratically elected officials choose political goals, while technocrats choose the most efficient ways to realize those goals, serving as advisors and implementers. Technocracy is closely related to meritocracy, expertocracy, epistocracy, managerialism, and algocracy. It contrasts with populism, which frames politics as a struggle between common people and a perceived elite.

Proponents of technocracy argue that scientific expertise and evidence-guided policy produce better outcomes. They hold that its value-neutral approach is best suited to promote the long-term welfare of society as a whole. Opponents contend that technocracy is anti-democratic by excluding large segments of the population from politics, that the claim to neutrality masks value-laden choices, and that science alone is insufficient for political decisions.

Early contributions to the idea of technocracy appear in the utopian visions of Plato, Francis Bacon, and Henri de Saint-Simon. The notion of science- and rationality-based governance gained prominence during the Enlightenment and became increasingly influential as industrial and post-industrial transformations made societies more complex. Notable examples of technocratic influence are found in the North American technocracy movement of the 1930s, Soviet and Chinese centralized planning, developmental efforts in Latin America and Singapore, and the institutional architecture of the European Union.

Definition

Technocracy is a form of government or an approach to political action that emphasizes expertise, but its precise definition is disputed. One characterization focuses on who makes decisions, defining technocracy as rule by experts in contrast to democracy as rule by the people. Another centers on decision procedures rather than rulers, highlighting the role of technical skills, scientific evidence, and instrumental rationality.[1] More abstractly, technocracy can be defined as the view that the main source of political legitimacy is expert-driven reasoning and specialized knowledge, rather than popular will or hereditary entitlement.[2]

In its strongest sense, technocracy means that all main governmental operations follow technocratic principles. Because pure technocracy is rare, the term is often used in a weaker sense to describe leadership styles or institutions that apply such principles within other forms of government, such as a democratically elected leader who relies heavily on expert advice, or a central bank in which unelected officials set monetary policy based on technical criteria.[3]

A hallmark of technocracy is its science-focused approach. It frames policy objectives, resource allocation, and administrative procedures in terms of evidence-based and efficiency-oriented processes that follow a rigorous methodology privileging quantifiable outcomes. It typically employs cost-benefit analysis and risk management, intended to improve long-term prosperity of society as a whole rather than serving the partisan interests of specific groups. Advocates emphasize the method's objective and impartial character, but its claims to value-neutrality and freedom from ideology are contested. Technocracy is normally considered a form of elitism since large parts of the population may lack the technical knowledge and specialized skills required to participate in complex policy decisions. Anti-pluralism is another frequently discussed feature. It reflects the commitment to the singular interest of the long-term social welfare of the whole community in contrast to political processes that mediate among competing interests and preferences of distinct groups.[4]

A technocrat is someone who supports technocracy.[5][a] A technotopia is an idealized society or government model in which all major aspects of governance are guided by technical expertise.[6] The term technocracy comes from the ancient Greek words τέχνη (tekhne), meaning 'skill' or 'craft', and κράτος (kratos), meaning 'rule'.[5] Its earliest known use dates to the 1890s.[7] The engineer William H. Smyth is usually credited with coining the modern meaning of the term in 1919. The term's popularity increased in the 1930s as part of the technocratic movement.[8]

Areas and approaches

Technocratic principles can be applied to different areas of governance and implemented in several ways. In its broadest form, a pure technocracy would be a society in which decision-making in all sectors and policy domains is guided by experts following empirical evidence. However, this theoretical ideal is not found in real-world conditions, where technocracy usually manifests as a hybrid model integrated with other approaches to governance.[9] Some policy areas are more amenable to technocratic management than others, particularly those with clearly defined policy goals, quantifiable metrics, and accessible evidence.[10]

Central banks often rely on financial experts operating relatively insulated from electoral processes, such as the European Central Bank.[11]

One key area is the central banking system, in which financial experts often operate independently of electoral processes. Central banks are responsible for monetary policy and financial stability. For example, they typically control the base interest rate to promote price stability, high employment, and economic growth. Their decisions are based on diverse technical indicators, such as inflation and employment figures, weighing trade-offs among their objectives to achieve a prudent balance.[12] Other economy-related aspects of technocratic governance include fiscal policy, taxation, and the management of financial crises.[13]

Technocratic principles are also applied to the area of healthcare. Expert panels may implement reforms to medical training, increase reliance on medical technology, design and evaluate vaccination programs, adjust drug policy, and coordinate responses during health crises, such as pandemics. Technocrat concerns about efficient resource allocation may depersonalize the doctor–patient relationship and can lead to reductions of public health services by cutting cost-ineffective interventions to prioritize high-impact treatments.[14]

In the field of education, the influence of technocracy can take various forms. Experts may revise curricula and propose reforms, often with an emphasis on centralization while reducing the autonomy of local institutions. This approach is usually accompanied by standardization, such as standardized testing and quantifiable metrics to track educational progress. Another facet is the integration of modern technology into classrooms, including computers, the internet, and artificial intelligence.[15] A further intersection is found in educational institutions or programs that prepare elite students for expert roles in governance, such as specialized schools or competitive selection processes that filter candidates for senior civil service careers.[6]

In environmental policy, technocratic principles are used to adjust regulations to ecological issues, ranging from climate change to water quality and biodiversity conservation.[16] Other relevant areas include urban planning, energy infrastructure, and research funding.[17]

In addition to the variety of policy areas, there are also different ways of implementing technocratic principles. One model casts technocrats as advisors who collect and interpret empirical evidence, devise policy options, and evaluate their advantages and disadvantages. In this role, technocrats do not hold immediate decision-making powers but wield influence indirectly by shaping how leaders understand and choose among alternatives. This approach contrasts with models in which technocrats have direct authority.[18] Technocracy can also shape governance by implementing decision-making procedures and bureaucratic systems, shifting the emphasis from who holds office to how decisions are made. In this case, technocratic power resides more in administrative mechanisms and organizational arrangements than in individual experts.[19]

Another approach focuses on information technology to assist or automate political decisions. For example, algocracy relies on algorithms and artificial intelligence to analyze data and devise policies. Proposed models vary in the role of humans, ranging from humans as primary decision-makers assisted by artificial intelligence to fully automated systems.[20] Cyberocracy, a similar concept, envisions a future form of government in which information and access to information technology are the primary sources of political power.[21]

Technocrats typically aim for the long-term prosperity of the community as a whole, but this goal can be interpreted in different ways. The Keynesian model seeks to achieve it through economic growth and fair redistribution, relying on an extensive bureaucracy and comprehensive planning. Neoliberal approaches, by contrast, seek to promote community well-being through competition among individuals and organizations, centering technocratic policies on competitive frameworks and risk management.[22]

Relation to other political ideologies

Democracy

Jürgen Habermas argued that expert knowledge should be integrated into democratic processes without replacing them.[23]

Various academic discussions of technocracy examine its relation to other political ideologies, such as democracy. Democracy vests political power in the people. Citizens have the most immediate control in direct democracy, where they participate by voting on laws and policies. In indirect democracy, they elect representatives who decide on the public's behalf.[24]

Technocracy is often framed as a challenge or alternative to democracy. This view emphasizes their contrasting principles of political legitimacy and decision-making. Technocracy grounds authority in expertise and technical knowledge, resulting in decisions that may not align with popular opinion or the consent of the governed. As a result, democratic accountability to voter preferences is replaced by the responsibility of pursuing the long-term common good. Similarly, technocratic procedures of evidence-based analysis and expert deliberation bypass democratic decision-making through confrontation and negotiation among competing interest groups and viewpoints. This is typically accompanied by depoliticization, with contentious issues being framed as neutral technical problems, whereas democratic processes acknowledge evaluative differences and seek to mediate among them. Although technocracy does not restrict political participation through rigid hereditary or class systems, its reliance on specialized expertise often excludes large segments of the population and marginalizes lay perspectives.[25]

A contrasting view rejects the claim that democracy and technocracy are incompatible, seeing them instead as complementary approaches whose tensions can be resolved. One outlook argues that technocracy is primarily about instrumental rationality or how to choose the means to achieve a given goal. According to this view, the people or elected officials choose political goals while the technocrats choose the most efficient ways to realize those goals, acting as advisors and implementers. Another approach confines technocracy to certain institutions or functions within a government. For example, a democratically elected government may delegate monetary policy or public health reforms to expert panels.[26] In this context, one argument holds that every government relies on technocratic principles to some degree by consulting experts and aligning policy to empirical evidence.[27]

The compatibility of democracy and technocracy may also depend on social circumstances. Beneficial conditions for technocratic democracies include a broad consensus on the general goals of state policy and a willingness of individuals to accept short-term personal sacrifices for the sake of the long-term prosperity of the community.[28]

Populism

Technocracy is commonly contrasted with populism, which seeks to promote the interests of ordinary people. Populism typically frames politics as a struggle between morally pure people and a corrupt, self-serving elite. It usually promotes a personalistic leader who appeals to popular sentiment and is regarded as a direct representative of the will of the people.[29]

In several respects, populism is directly opposed to technocracy. Its skeptical attitude toward elitism and expert rule challenges the technocratic reliance on expertise and specialized knowledge. This tension is also reflected in the sources of political legitimacy: populism emphasizes mass mobilization and the representation of popular opinion, whereas technocracy sees evidence-based competence and scientific rationality as primary sources of authority.[30]

However, there are also aspects in which populism and technocracy overlap. Both are seen as challenges or threats to democracy, in part because of their anti-pluralistic outlooks. In populism, this tendency is expressed in its claim to represent a unified popular will, dismissing dissenting views as betrayals of the people's true interests. In technocracy, dissenting views are often portrayed as irrational or biased positions that do not align with expert opinions on how to promote the long-term prosperity of the community as a whole.[31]

Technopopulism attempts to reconcile these two approaches. It combines the populist appeal to a personalistic leader representing the will of the people with a claim to legitimacy based on the leader's expertise, usually coupled with a technology-focused outlook.[32]

Others

As a form of elitism, technocracy vests political power in a small group of technical experts.[33] Other types of elitism have different criteria of political inclusion. Aristocracy has a social class of ruling elites, typically grounded in hereditary birth and inherited titles.[34] Plutocracy places political authority in the hands of the wealthy.[35] Theocracy merges political and religious power, justifying its authority by appeal to a divine command.[36] Elitism contrasts with egalitarianism, which holds that all individuals should have equal political rights and opportunities.[37]

Technocracy is closely related to meritocracy, which highlights the principle of merit by selecting people based on their ability. It can apply to governmental positions or, more broadly, to any social function or job. The core idea is that everybody has the position they deserve.[38] Expertocracy is sometimes defined as a weaker form of technocracy that seeks to align decision-making processes to expert opinions without transferring power to technical elites.[39][b] Other related political ideologies include epistocracy, which asserts that the degree of political influence of citizens should correspond to their competence in political decision-making,[40] and managerialism, which advocates business-like and efficiency-driven management techniques.[41]

Through its emphasis on value neutrality, technocracy contrasts with political ideologies that explicitly advance substantive values or normative goals.[42] For example, liberalism promotes personal freedom, individual rights, tolerance, the rule of law, and the protection of private property.[43] Socialism prioritizes economic equality, social welfare, and collective ownership.[44] Nationalism values social cohesion grounded in national identity and shared customs, culture, and language.[45] Technocracy typically seeks to sideline evaluative and ideological commitments by framing decisions around empirical evidence and cost-benefit analysis rather than pursuing substantive values.[46] However, it may also be combined with certain normative goals, as in neoliberal technocracy and technocratic socialism.[47]

Technocracy is typically contrasted with authoritarianism, which seeks to centralize and monopolize political power in a single leader or party and uses a hierarchical structure to suppress dissent. However, authoritarian regimes may adopt technocratic principles to consolidate control and justify their legitimacy by appealing to efficiency and expertise, giving rise to techno-authoritarianism.[48]

Arguments

For

Howard Scott, a leading figure of the Technical Alliance and Technocracy Inc., held that technocratic governance can maximize efficiency and increase abundance.[49]

Political theorists discuss various arguments for and against technocracy. Advocates emphasize the central role of skill and competence in political decision-making. They argue that political situations are complex, particularly in a globalized world marked by rapid technological advances. These complexities make it difficult to consider all relevant factors, predict outcomes of increasingly interconnected processes, and adjust policies accordingly. This view holds that scientific expertise and evidence-guided inquiry offer a better foundation for effective political decisions than ideology or popular sentiment. Technocrats highlight the rationality and efficiency of their procedures, which seek to avoid contradictory and irrational elements found in approaches that rely on partisan interests and public opinion. Accordingly, they promise better outcomes, benefiting the community as a whole through material progress.[50]

Another line of thought centers on value-neutrality. It asserts that the technocratic focus on objective analysis and scientific solutions promotes the implementation of optimal solutions that prioritize overall welfare. Advocates hold that the ideal of serving the community as a whole helps insulate policy from partisan agendas and lobbying efforts that privilege specific interest groups. Similarly, the emphasis on competence, transparent decision criteria, and quantifiable results constitutes a form of meritocratic fairness that can safeguard against corruption and nepotism.[51]

A different set of arguments focuses on the long-term perspective. It asserts that technocracies are better suited to implement necessary but unpopular reforms that benefit the community in the long run. This view maintains that expert-driven political legitimacy sidelines short-term electoral pressures or incentives to maximize popular approval through immediate benefits. Supporters further highlight technocracy's openness to innovation and flexibility to adapt policy in response to emerging challenges or new data.[52]

Against

Critics of technocracy often focus on its anti-democratic tendencies, viewing it as a form of elitism that excludes large segments of the population from political participation. They argue that governance should align with public consent and reflect a diversity of opinions and preferences. In their view, technocracy alienates ordinary people from politics by framing policy choices as purely technical problems. A related concern is that technocratic decision makers are not directly accountable to the electorate, raising questions about their political legitimacy and the risk of a technology-justified authoritarianism.[53]

Another criticism rejects the claim that technocracy is value-neutral. It argues that the reliance on scientific methods, quantitative metrics, and efficiency carries implicit evaluative biases, meaning that ideological commitments and value conflicts are not removed but merely hidden under the guise of objective analysis.[54] A related objection holds that a technocratic focus on instrumental rationality reduces political decisions to problems of optimization and neglects the intrinsic worth of individuals. It contends that instrumental rationality about the best means to achieve a goal needs to be accompanied by normative rationality about which goals are worth pursuing. This view asserts that there are diverse normative goals and that politics should consider different options and negotiate value trade-offs instead of adopting a narrow perspective that disregards alternative outlooks. Similarly, claims to neutrality can hide partisan agendas, such as attempts by corporate lobbies to influence policy under the guise of impartial optimization.[55]

Critics also target the strong focus on science and the claim that technocracies achieve better outcomes. They argue that technocracy adopts scientism and falsely assumes that science can solve all political problems. In response, they assert that the scientific method is limited and cannot reliably predict social outcomes, specifically in complex and interconnected systems of human behavior. Many aspects of social life are difficult to quantify, and efforts to do so can result in misleading metrics that ignore key factors. This can produce implementation gaps in which idealized models fail in real-world conditions. Unique local contexts pose further challenges, as attempts to impose uniform solutions can lead to unexpected results.[56] Additionally, there are expert disagreements in which competing theories predict divergent outcomes without providing clear guidance for policymakers on which theory to follow.[57] On a conceptual level, critics hold that technocracy is a poorly defined notion that can denote a wide spectrum of approaches to governance depending on the context.[58]

History

Intellectual and cultural developments

Some precursors to technocratic thought are found in ancient philosophy. In ancient Greece, Plato (c. 427 – c. 347 BCE) characterized politics as a techne—an art or craft with a specific goal, comparable to other expert practices such as medicine. He argued that political skill and knowledge of human nature are essential to just and prudent leadership. He regarded rule by wise philosopher-kings as the ideal form of governance.[59] In ancient China, some technocratic principles are reflected in Confucianism, which arose in the 6th or 5th century BCE. They include the elitist view that the most virtuous and capable should rule.[60] Beginning in the 7th century CE, this tradition also saw the emergence of a rigorous, merit-based examination system designed to select the most competent candidates for government service.[6]

In his New Atlantis, Francis Bacon envisioned a technocratic utopia ruled by scientists.[61] Henri de Saint-Simon is sometimes regarded as the "father of technocracy" because of his idea of a new kind of society based on scientific rationality.[62]

In the 16th and 17th centuries, the Scientific Revolution established a new paradigm of rational inquiry in which truth is not passively revealed but actively discovered by following the scientific method and seeking empirical evidence.[63] During the subsequent Age of Enlightenment in the late 17th and 18th centuries, Enlightenment thinkers emphasized reason, science, and technical rationality. They promoted the pursuit of knowledge and challenged traditional authorities.[64] This cultural and intellectual movement shaped the French Revolution, which introduced several technocratic principles into governance. It advanced programs of social engineering and recast political authority around meritocratic expertise.[65][c] The growing economic complexity during the Industrial Revolution in the late 18th and 19th centuries further accelerated the demand for specialized knowledge and expert-led management.[67]

These developments also influenced political thought. Francis Bacon (1561–1626) envisioned a technocratic utopia in his New Atlantis. Unlike Plato, he argued that empirical scientists, rather than philosopher-kings, should rule. For Bacon, politics should take the form of scientific administration, with scientific elites as benevolent rulers promoting the general interest of the whole.[61] Building on Bacon's vision, Henri de Saint-Simon (1760–1825) conceived a new kind of society based on scientific rationality. He held that a society led by scientists, artists, and industrialists would prosper, with a merit-based hierarchy and an elite class made up of the most educated and productive members of society. Saint-Simon is sometimes regarded as the "father of technocracy".[62] His student Auguste Comte (1798–1857) formulated positivism, arguing that scientific understanding based on empirical evidence is the highest form of knowledge.[68] Jeremy Bentham's (1748–1832) utilitarianism also influenced technocratic thought, particularly the idea that governance should maximize overall welfare, laying the groundwork for cost-benefit analysis in public administration.[69] In his novel Looking Backward, Edward Bellamy (1850–1898) reached a mass audience with his utopian vision of technocracy in which technology is harnessed to ensure abundance, leisure, and peace for all citizens.[6]

Frederick Winslow Taylor (1856–1915) developed and popularized the application of scientific management and efficiency-focused organization to industrial manufacturing and labor processes.[70][d] Henry Gantt (1861–1919), an associate of Taylor, sought to extend these ideas into the political realm. He proposed a "new democracy" that grounds governance in scientific facts. For him, the degree of an individual's political authority should correspond to their ability and willingness to advance the common good.[72] His outlook was also influenced by Thorstein Veblen (1857–1929), who criticized capitalism for introducing conflicts of interest that hinder the public good. He argued that a system run by engineers and technicians could better serve common prosperity.[73]

Max Weber (1864–1920) explored the role of instrumental rationality in modern society. He argued that the pervasiveness of scientific and technical reason is a key feature of modernity, emphasizing the importance of mathematical and scientific knowledge and the increasing reliance on trained experts and managers to organize social life.[74]

During the two World Wars, technocratic principles were implemented to gain military and economic advantages by increasing productivity and efficiency. This happened in several fields, including the weapons industry, logistics, and mobilization of the workforce.[75]

In the book The Managerial Revolution, James Burnham (1905–1987) grounded technocratic principles in a sociological analysis of the growing role of managers and technical experts in modern industrial societies.[76] John Kenneth Galbraith (1908–2006) further explored these ideas in his book The New Industrial State, arguing that advanced technology requires large corporations, long-term planning, and an extensive network of technical experts.[77] In the book The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, Daniel Bell (1919–2011) shifted the focus from industrial to post-industrial society. He highlighted the importance of technocratic principles as knowledge, science, and information technologies become the primary drivers of economic growth.[78]

Postmodern thinkers examined the increasing centrality of expert knowledge in modern society. Michel Foucault (1926–1984) explored how knowledge is used to wield power over populations through indirect mechanisms embedded in correctional, medical, and educational institutions.[79] Jean-François Lyotard (1924–1998) warned of the totalizing and dehumanizing tendencies of technocratic rationality.[80] A different criticism was formulated by the Frankfurt School theorist Jürgen Habermas (1929–2026), who regarded technocracy as a threat to democracy, proposing that expert knowledge should be integrated into democratic processes without replacing them.[23]

In different regions

Symbol of Technocracy Inc. Various aspects of technocratic governance were present in the Soviet Union, particularly during the leadership of Leonid Brezhnev.[81]

In the 1930s in North America, the technocracy movement emerged from the Technical Alliance, which had been founded in 1919 by Howard Scott (1890–1970). Followers of the technocracy movement applied Veblen's ideas to the Great Depression—a deep economic crisis that had started in 1929. They argued that this crisis was a symptom of capitalism and proposed a technocratic reorganization of society to overcome it. In addition to the political governance by engineers, scientists, and technical managers, this program aimed to replace the price-based economy with one that organizes distribution and consumption based on energy costs. It sought to increase abundance while reducing average workload through centralized planning, integrating North America into a self-sufficient unit called a technate.[82][e] In the post-World War II decades, technocracy influenced U.S. politics by shaping institutional frameworks, particularly in economic and military spheres. Links to politics happened through regulatory and advisory bodies such as the Atomic Energy Commission, the National Science Foundation, the Council of Economic Advisers, and the RAND Corporation.[84]

Various aspects of technocratic governance were also present in the Soviet Union, such as the centralized economic planning by experts under the State Planning Committee, established in 1921. These tendencies were particularly prominent during the leadership of Leonid Brezhnev (1906–1982), who promoted a scientific-technological revolution with an increased reliance on engineers as political leaders.[81]

In the 1950s and early 1960s, China implemented technocratic elements as engineers from elite universities rose to political power to engage in central planning and implement communist-style industrialization. This trend saw a significant backlash during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), marked by anti-elitism and anti-intellectualism. Since the late 1970s, the technocratic influence has been restored and expanded, with leadership often characterized by a synthesis of technical expertise and socialist ideology.[85]

Technocratic tendencies were prominent in Latin America starting in the 1960s and 1970s, both in democratic and authoritarian regimes. They typically took the form of state-led development efforts in sectors such as agriculture, industry, and health, exemplified by the expert-guided reforms in Colombia under the National Front governments. In subsequent decades, the technocratic agenda in Latin America increasingly centered on the economy.[86]

Since the 1970s and 1980s, Singapore saw the establishment of an administrative state focused on rational organization, technical skill, and meritocratic egalitarianism while seeking to avoid ideological polarization and partisan interests. Because of its economic success in the form of rapid development and growth, it is often regarded as a leading exemplar of the advantages of technocracy.[87] Other Asian examples of the implementation of technocratic principles are found in Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan.[88]

Beginning in the second half of the 20th century, the formation of the European Union introduced various forms of technocratic governance, such as the establishment of expert-led institutions with little democratic control, including the European Central Bank.[89] Starting in the 1990s, evidence-based policy making has become an influential approach in the United Kingdom, seeking to align governance with robust empirical evidence and rigorous scientific evaluation.[90] In the 2000s and 2010s, several EU countries adopted technocratic measures in response to political or economic turmoil, such as technocratic cabinets in Italy and Greece during the European financial crisis.[91]

See also

• Bright green environmentalism – Stance favoring the convergence of technological change with environmentalism

• Player Piano – First novel published by Kurt Vonnegut in 1952

• Post-politics – Critique of post-Cold War politics of consensus

• Post-scarcity economy – Situation in which all goods are available to all free of charge

• Project Cybersyn – Chilean economic-management project

• Redressement Français – French anti-parliamentarian political movement

• Scientocracy – System of government

References

Notes

1. The term is sometimes used in a derogatory sense to imply an overemphasis of technology and a lacking awareness of moral and humanistic considerations.[5]

2. In a different sense, expertocracy can also mean that experts seize power from democratically elected officials.[19]

3. A further development in France was the establishment of elite schools, the Grande écoles, which served to train state administrators, engineers, and scientists, preparing a technocratic elite.[66]

4. Influenced by this approach, Henry Ford (1863–1947) translated scientific management into standardized mass production using assembly lines.[71]

5. The movement later split into two rival groups, the Continental Committee on Technocracy led by Harold Loeb and Technocracy Inc. led by Scott, but its influence declined in the following years.[83]

Citations

1. • Caramani 2020, pp. 3–4

   • Hakken 2008

   • Bickerton & Accetti 2020, pp. 29–32

   • Esmark 2020, pp. 3–4

   • Lenk 2005, Lead section, § Types of Technocracy

2. Rummens 2024, § 1. Technocracy as a Thin Ideology

3. • Esmark 2020, p. 3, 53, 64–65

   • Caramani 2020, pp. 4, 12

4. • Esmark 2020, pp. 2–4

   • Caramani 2020, p. 4

   • Bertsou & Caramani 2020, pp. 93–94

5. Wilson 2008

6. Pfaffenberger 2008

7. OED staff 2026

8. • Visser 2026, pp. 201–202

   • Hakken 2008

9. • Esmark 2020, p. 3, 53, 64–65

   • Caramani 2020, pp. 4, 12

   • Bickerton & Accetti 2021, pp. 25–32

   • Fischer 1990, pp. 18

10. • Caramani 2020, pp. 4, 12–14

    • Centeno 1993, pp. 315–316

11. • Centeno 1993, pp. 321–322

    • Habermas 2015, pp. 3–8

12. • Centeno 1993, p. 321

    • Esmark 2020, p. 47, 64–65

    • Moenjak 2014, pp. 60–61, 70

13. • Valbruzzi 2020, p. 124

    • Friedman 2019, pp. § I.3 Technocratic Regulation and the Limits of State Autonomy

    • Bertsou & Caramani 2020, pp. 91–92

    • Sánchez-Cuenca 2020, p. 57

14. • Burris 1993, pp. 120–125

    • Alexiadou 2020, pp. 137, 144–147

    • Clarence 2002, pp. 3, 7–9

    • Bertsou 2026, pp. 483–484

15. • Burris 1993, pp. 130–135

    • Trifonas 2018, pp. 3–5

    • Clarence 2002, pp. 3

16. • Selk 2025, pp. 1–5

    • Olson 2015, p. 26

    • Tacconi 2017, p. 81

17. • Moroni 2017, pp. 141

    • Stephens & Allen 2021, p. 190

    • Clarence 2002, pp. 3

    • Silva 2007, pp. 76–77

18. • Lenk 2005, § Types of Technocracy

    • Bickerton & Accetti 2020, pp. 30–31

19. Lenk 2005, § Types of Technocracy

20. • Danaher 2016, § 1. Introduction, § 2. What Is Algocracy?

    • Lenk 2005, § Types of Technocracy

21. Ronfeldt 1992, pp. 243–244, 255–256, 268

22. Rummens 2024, § 1. Technocracy as a Thin Ideology, § 2. From Welfarist Bureaucracy to Neoliberal Governance

23. Baynes & Prattico 2022, pp. 107–110

24. • Caramani 2020, pp. 1–3

    • Dargent 2015, pp. 13–14

    • Scruton 2007, pp. 169–171

25. • Caramani 2020, pp. 6–11

    • Bertsou & Caramani 2020, pp. 93–94

    • Centeno 1993, pp. 326–237, 239–330

26. • Bickerton & Accetti 2020, pp. 30–31

    • Rummens 2024, § 1. Technocracy as a Thin Ideology

27. • Bertsou & Caramani 2020, pp. 93–94

    • Lenk 2005, § Assessment

28. • Centeno 1993, pp. 326–238

    • Gratton & Edenhofer 2025, pp. 1–2

29. • Scruton 2007, p. 537

    • Bickerton & Accetti 2021, pp. 25–28

    • Bickerton & Accetti 2015, pp. 1–2, 15–16

30. • Rummens 2024, Lead sectin, § 1. Technocracy as a Thin Ideology

    • Esmark 2020, pp. 1–2, 204–205, 222

    • Scruton 2007, p. 537

31. • Bickerton & Accetti 2015, pp. 1–2, 15–16

    • Rummens 2024, Lead sectin, § 1. Technocracy as a Thin Ideology

    • Bickerton & Accetti 2021, pp. 25–32

    • Centeno 1993, pp. 327,

32. Bickerton & Accetti 2021, pp. 17–19, 24

33. Bertsou & Caramani 2020, p. 94

34. Scruton 2007, pp. 36–38

35. Scruton 2007, pp. 528

36. • Fiala 2015, p. 252

    • Scruton 2007, pp. 687–688

37. Scruton 2007, pp. 205–206

38. • Scruton 2007, pp. 436

    • Fiala 2015, pp. 242

    • Brown, McLean & McMillan 2018, § Meritocracy

39. Selk 2025, pp. 1–3

40. Méndez 2022, pp. 153–154

41. Eagleton-Pierce & Knafo 2020, pp. 763–764

42. • Bertsou & Caramani 2020, p. 94

    • Burris 1993, pp. 8, 34, 151

43. • Waldron 1998, § Lead section

    • Knowles 2006, pp. 70–71

    • Moseley, § 3a. Liberalism

    • Scruton 2007, pp. 394–395

44. • Moseley, § 3c. Socialism

    • Scruton 2007, pp. 646–648

    • Fiala 2015, p. 250

    • Gilabert & O'Neill 2024, Lead section

45. • Fiala 2015, p. 243

    • Scruton 2007, pp. 465–466

    • Hill & Moore 2025, pp. 485–486

46. • Bertsou & Caramani 2020, p. 94

    • Sadowski 2020, pp. 112–113

47. • Sánchez-Cuenca 2020, pp. 44–46

    • Hoffmann & Laird 1985, pp. 1–5

48. • Russo, Lalot & Roccato 2025, p. 1

    • Esmark 2020, pp. 85–86, 95–96

    • Peron, Almstadter Mattar de Magalhães & Caetano 2025, pp. 1–2

    • Fiala 2015, p. 227

49. • Esmark 2020, pp. 34–36

    • Fischer 1990, pp. 85–86

50. • Caramani 2020, pp. 3–4, 21

    • Bickerton & Accetti 2020, pp. 32–39

    • Fischer 1990, pp. 22–24

    • Bertsou & Caramani 2020, pp. 93–94

51. • Bertsou & Caramani 2020, pp. 94

    • Fischer 1990, pp. 21–22, 29–30

    • Caramani 2020, pp. 3–4, 8–9, 17, 21

    • Radaelli 2017, pp. 25–26

52. • Caramani 2020, pp. 3–4

    • Bertsou & Caramani 2020, pp. 93–94

    • Burris 1993, pp. 9, 17–19

53. • Fischer 1990, pp. 15–16, 21–22

    • Bickerton & Accetti 2020, pp. 39–42

    • Caramani 2020, pp. 9–10, 13

54. • Caramani 2020, pp. 3–4, 8–9

    • Clarence 2002, pp. 2–6

55. • Caramani 2020, pp. 3–4, 8–9

    • Fischer 1990, pp. 40–49

    • Gunnell 1982, pp. 394–395, 397–398

56. • Friedman 2019, p. 1–4, 25–26

    • Selk 2025, pp. 5, 15–17

    • Clarence 2002, pp. 4

    • Esmark 2020, pp. 7, 173

57. • Riess 2022, pp. 218, 230

    • Friedman 2019, p. 25

58. • Cole 2022, Lead section, § The Concept of Technocracy

    • Fischer 1990, pp. 17–18

    • Esmark 2020, pp. 1–4

59. • Bickerton & Accetti 2020, pp. 32–34

    • Radaelli 2017, pp. 12–13

60. • Liu, Lan & Zhu 2021, pp. 119–120

    • DK staff 2018, p. 76

61. • Burris 1993, pp. 21–22

    • Fischer 1990, pp. 66–67

    • Radaelli 2017, pp. 14

62. • Burris 1993, pp. 22–24

    • Fischer 1990, pp. 67–70

    • Radaelli 2017, pp. 14–15

63. • Fischer 1990, pp. 66–69

    • Esmark 2020, p. 21

    • Paterson 2012, pp. 65

64. • Burris 1993, pp. 21–22

    • Fischer 1990, pp. 66–69

    • Radaelli 2017, p. 13

65. • Esmark 2020, pp. 21–24

    • Fischer 1990, pp. 67–68

66. Esmark 2020, pp. 21–24

67. • Esmark 2020, pp. 20–21

    • Caramani 2020, pp. 1–5

68. Fischer 1990, pp. 70–72

69. • Fischer 1990, pp. 72–73

    • Crimmins 2026, Lead section, § 6. Civil Law and Political Economy, § 10. Influence

70. • Burris 1993, pp. 13–15

    • Olson 2015, pp. ix, 1–2

    • Radaelli 2017, pp. 16

71. • Burris 1993, pp. 8, 18

    • Curcio 2013, pp. 72–73

72. Olson 2015, pp. 22–23

73. • Burris 1993, pp. 25–28

    • Olson 2015, pp. 22–23

    • Esmark 2020, pp. 29–30

74. Fischer 1990, pp. 61–63

75. • Fischer 1990, pp. 91–92

    • Esmark 2020, pp. 19–20, 37, 177

76. • Burris 1993, pp. 33–36

    • Radaelli 2017, pp. 20–21

77. • Burris 1993, pp. 36–37

    • Radaelli 2017, pp. 21–22

78. • Burris 1993, pp. 37–39

    • Radaelli 2017, pp. 22

79. • Burris 1993, pp. 44–47

    • Gutting & Oksala 2025, § 3.1 Histories of Madness and Medicine, § 3.4 History of the Prison

80. • Burris 1993, pp. 47–50, 175

    • Gratton 2018, § 3.2 Justice in light of the Postmodern Condition, § 3.4 The Inhuman and the Event

81. • Hoffmann & Laird 1985, pp. 1–8, 170–172

    • Hinshaw & Stearns 2013, pp. 468–469

    • Graham 1993, pp. 73–74

82. • Esmark 2020, pp. 34–36

    • Günel 2019, pp. 115–116

    • Burris 1993, pp. 28–32

83. Esmark 2020, pp. 36–37

84. Esmark 2020, pp. 37–47

85. • Andreas 2009, pp. 1–14

    • Esmark 2020, pp. 3

86. • Dargent 2020, pp. 216–219

    • Dargent 2015, pp. 2–4

87. • Tan 2016, pp. 15–16

    • Esmark 2020, p. 3

    • Liu, Lan & Zhu 2021, p. 120

88. Centeno 1993, pp. 314–316

89. Habermas 2015, pp. 3–8

90. • Clarence 2002, pp. 1–3

    • Monaghan 2011, pp. 21–22

    • Hoornbeek 2011, pp. 861

91. Bertsou & Caramani 2020, pp. 91–92

Sources

• Alexiadou, Despina (2020). "Technocrats in Cabinets and their Policy Effects". In Bertsou, Eri; Caramani, Daniele (eds.). The Technocratic Challenge to Democracy. Routledge. pp. 131–147. ISBN 978-1-000-04360-0.

• Andreas, Joel (2009). Rise of the Red Engineers: The Cultural Revolution and the Origins of China's New Class. Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0-8047-7110-8.

• Baynes, Kenneth; Prattico, Emilie (2022). "Can Democracy Survive Without the Voice of Experts". In Prattico, Emilie (ed.). Habermas and the Crisis of Democracy: Interviews with Leading Thinkers. Routledge. pp. 100–119. ISBN 978-1-000-59699-1.

• Bertsou, Eri (2026). "Technocratic Attitudes During the COVID-19 Pandemic in Europe and the US". West European Politics. 49 (2): 483–513. doi:10.1080/01402382.2025.2463272.

• Bertsou, Eri; Caramani, Daniele (2020). "Measuring Technocracy". In Bertsou, Eri; Caramani, Daniele (eds.). The Technocratic Challenge to Democracy. Routledge. pp. 91–110. ISBN 978-1-000-04360-0.

• Bickerton, Christopher; Accetti, Carlo Invernizzi (2015). "Populism and Technocracy: Opposites or Complements?". Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy. 20 (2): 1–21. doi:10.1080/13698230.2014.995504.

• Bickerton, Christopher; Accetti, Carlo Invernizzi (2020). "Technocracy and Political Theory". In Bertsou, Eri; Caramani, Daniele (eds.). The Technocratic Challenge to Democracy. Routledge. pp. 29–43. ISBN 978-1-000-04360-0.

• Bickerton, Christopher J.; Accetti, Carlo Invernizzi (2021). Technopopulism: The New Logic of Democratic Politics. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-880776-6.

• Brown, Garrett Wallace; McLean, Iain; McMillan, Alistair (2018). The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics and International Relations. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-967084-0.

• Burris, Beverly H. (1993). Technocracy at Work. State University of New York Press. ISBN 978-0-7914-1495-8.

• Caramani, Daniele (2020). "Introduction". In Bertsou, Eri; Caramani, Daniele (eds.). The Technocratic Challenge to Democracy. Routledge. pp. 1–26. ISBN 978-1-000-04360-0.

• Centeno, Miguel Angel (1993). "The New Leviathan: The Dynamics and Limits of Technocracy". Theory and Society. 22 (3): 307–335. doi:10.1007/BF00993531.

• Clarence, Emma (2002). "Technocracy Reinvented: The New Evidence Based Policy Movement". Public Policy and Administration. 17 (3): 1–11. doi:10.1177/095207670201700301.

• Cole, Matthew (2022). "What's Wrong with Technocracy?". Boston Review. MIT Press. Retrieved 15 February 2026.

• Crimmins, James E. (2026). "Jeremy Bentham". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Retrieved 19 February 2026.

• Curcio, Vincent (2013). Henry Ford. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-971789-7.

• Danaher, John (2016). "The Threat of Algocracy: Reality, Resistance and Accommodation". Philosophy & Technology. 29 (3): 245–268. doi:10.1007/s13347-015-0211-1.

• Dargent, Eduardo (2015). Technocracy and Democracy in Latin America: The Experts Running Government. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-107-05987-0.

• Dargent, Eduardo (2020). "Technocracy in Latin America: Between Stability and Democratic Deficit". In Bertsou, Eri; Caramani, Daniele (eds.). The Technocratic Challenge to Democracy. Routledge. pp. 216–231. ISBN 978-1-000-04360-0.

• DK staff (2018). Timelines of Everything: From Woolly Mammoths to World Wars. Dorling Kindersley Limited. ISBN 978-0-241-42807-8.

• Eagleton-Pierce, Matthew; Knafo, Samuel (2020). "Introduction: The Political Economy of Managerialism". Review of International Political Economy. 27 (4): 763–779. doi:10.1080/09692290.2020.1735478.

• Esmark, Anders (2020). The New Technocracy. Policy Press. ISBN 978-1-5292-0088-1.

• Fiala, Andrew (2015). "Glossary". In Fiala, Andrew (ed.). The Bloomsbury Companion to Political Philosophy. Bloomsbury. pp. 227–254. ISBN 978-1-4411-1434-1.

• Fischer, Frank (1990). Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise. SAGE. ISBN 978-0-8039-3379-8.

• Friedman, Jeffrey (2019). Power Without Knowledge: A Critique of Technocracy. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-087717-0.

• Gilabert, Pablo; O'Neill, Martin (2024). "Socialism". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Retrieved 19 April 2025.

• Graham, Loren (1993). The Ghost of the Executed Engineer: Technology and the Fall of the Soviet Union. Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-35436-4.

• Gratton, Peter (2018). "Jean François Lyotard". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Retrieved 21 February 2026.

• Gratton, Gabriele; Edenhofer, Jacob (2025). "The Rise and Fall of Technocratic Democracies: Unstable Majorities and Delegation to Technocrats". Journal of European Public Policy: 1–30. doi:10.1080/13501763.2025.2576160.

• Günel, Gökçe (2019). Spaceship in the Desert: Energy, Climate Change, and Urban Design in Abu Dhabi. Duke University Press. ISBN 978-1-4780-0240-6.

• Gunnell, John G. (1982). "The Technocratic Image and the Theory of Technocracy". Technology and Culture. 23 (3): 392–416. doi:10.2307/3104485.

• Gutting, Gary; Oksala, Johanna (2025). "Michel Foucault". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Retrieved 21 February 2026.

• Habermas, Jürgen (2015). The Lure of Technocracy. John Wiley & Sons. ISBN 978-0-7456-8685-1.

• Hakken, David (2008). "Technocracy". International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (2nd ed.). Macmillan Reference. ISBN 978-0-02-866117-9.

• Hill, Arthur; Moore, Margaret (2025). "Nationalism". In Gaus, Gerald F.; D'Agostino, Fred; Muldoon, Ryan (eds.). The Routledge Companion to Social and Political Philosophy (2nd ed.). Routledge. pp. 485–495. ISBN 978-1-00-341159-8.

• Hinshaw, John; Stearns, Peter N. (2013). Industrialization in the Modern World: From the Industrial Revolution to the Internet [2 volumes]. Bloomsbury. ISBN 978-1-61069-088-1.

• Hoffmann, Erik P.; Laird, Robbin Frederick (1985). Technocratic Socialism: The Soviet Union in the Advanced Industrial Era. Duke University Press. ISBN 978-0-8223-0692-4.

• Hoornbeek, John A. (2011). "Evidence-Based Policy". In Badie, Bertrand; Berg-Schlosser, Dirk; Morlino, Leonardo (eds.). International Encyclopedia of Political Science. SAGE. pp. 860–862. ISBN 978-1-4522-6649-7.

• Knowles, Dudley (2006). Political Philosophy. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-36086-3.

• Lenk, Hans (2005). "Technocracy". In Mitcham, Carl (ed.). Encyclopedia of Science, Technology, and Ethics. Macmillan Reference. ISBN 978-0-02-865834-6.

• Liu, Yongmou; Lan, Lishan; Zhu, Qin (2021). "Technocracy". In Grunwald, Armin; Hillerbrand, Rafaela (eds.). Handbuch Technikethik. J.B. Metzler. pp. 119–122. doi:10.1007/978-3-476-04901-8_22. ISBN 978-3-476-04900-1.

• Méndez, María Pía (2022). "An Epistemic Problem for Epistocracy". Social Epistemology. 36 (2): 153–166. doi:10.1080/02691728.2021.1992531.

• Moenjak, Thammarak (2014). Central Banking: Theory and Practice in Sustaining Monetary and Financial Stability. John Wiley & Sons. ISBN 978-1-118-83257-8.

• Monaghan, Mark (2011). Evidence Versus Politics: Exploiting Research in UK Drug Policy Making?. Policy Press. ISBN 978-1-84742-697-0.

• Moroni, Stefano (2017). "12. Urban Planning". In Iossifova, Deljana; Doll, Christopher N. H.; Gasparatos, Alexandros (eds.). Defining the Urban: Interdisciplinary and Professional Perspectives. Routledge. pp. 141–152. ISBN 978-1-317-15349-8.

• Moseley, Alexander. "Political Philosophy: Methodology". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 6 April 2025.

• OED staff (2026). "Technocracy, n." Oxford English Dictionary. Oxford University Press.

• Olson, Richard G. (2015). Scientism and Technocracy in the Twentieth Century: The Legacy of Scientific Management. Lexington Books. ISBN 978-1-4985-2571-8.

• Paterson, J. (2012). "Science for Risk Reduction and Sustainable Development: The Role of Law". In Beer, Tom; Ismail-Zadeh, Alik (eds.). Risk Science and Sustainability: Science for Reduction of Risk and Sustainable Development of Society. Springer Science & Business Media. pp. 63–76. ISBN 978-94-010-0167-0.

• Peron, Alcides Eduardo dos Reis; Almstadter Mattar de Magalhães, David; Caetano, Gabriel Fernandes (2025). "Beyond Digital Repression: Techno-authoritarianism in Radical Right Governments". Cogent Social Sciences. 11 (1). doi:10.1080/23311886.2025.2528457.

• Pfaffenberger, Bryan (2008). "Technotopia". International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (2nd ed.). Macmillan Reference. ISBN 978-0-02-866117-9.

• Radaelli, Claudio M. (2017). Technocracy in the European Union. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-317-88435-4.

• Riess, Julian (2022). "Why Do Experts Disagree?". In Gunn, Paul (ed.). Technocracy and the Epistemology of Human Behavior: The Debate over Power Without Knowledge. Taylor & Francis. pp. 218–241. ISBN 978-1-000-78405-3.

• Ronfeldt, David (1992). "Cyberocracy is Coming". The Information Society. 8 (4): 243–296. doi:10.1080/01972243.1992.9960123.

• Rummens, Stefan (2024). "Technocracy as a Thin Ideology". Constellations. 31 (2): 174–188. doi:10.1111/1467-8675.12676.

• Russo, Silvia; Lalot, Fanny; Roccato, Michele (2025). "Support for Technocratic and Authoritarian Governance in Times of Crisis: The Role of Trust and COVID-19 Concerns". International Journal of Public Opinion Research. 37 (3). doi:10.1093/ijpor/edaf042.

• Sadowski, Jathan (2020). "Rediscovering a Risky Ideology: Technocracy and Its Effects on Technology Governance". Journal of Responsible Innovation. 7 (sup1): 112–116. doi:10.1080/23299460.2020.1816345.

• Sánchez-Cuenca, Ignacio (2020). "Neoliberal Technocracy: The Challenge to Democratic Self-government". In Bertsou, Eri; Caramani, Daniele (eds.). The Technocratic Challenge to Democracy. Routledge. pp. 44–60. ISBN 978-1-000-04360-0.

• Scruton, Roger (2007). The Palgrave Macmillan Dictionary of Political Thought. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-0-230-62509-9.

• Selk, Veith (2025). "Expertocracy as Thin-centered Ideology: Theoretical Concepts and Empirical Illustrations". Political Research Exchange. 7 (1). doi:10.1080/2474736X.2025.2575772.

• Silva, Patricio (2007). "Government-Business Relations and Economic Performance in SOuth Korea and Chile: A Political Perspective". In Boyd, Richard; Benno, Galjart; Ngo, Tak-Wing (eds.). Political Conflict and Development in East Asia and Latin America. Routledge. pp. 74–117. ISBN 978-1-134-22859-1.

• Stephens, Jennie C.; Allen, Elizabeth (2021). "A Feminist Lens on Energy Democracy: Redistributing Power and Resisting Oppression Through Renewable Transformation". In Feldpausch-Parker, Andrea M.; Endres, Danielle; Peterson, Tarla Rai; Gomez, Stephanie L. (eds.). Routledge Handbook of Energy Democracy. Routledge. pp. 187–199. ISBN 978-0-429-68856-0.

• Tacconi, Luca (2017). Biodiversity and Ecological Economics: Participatory Approaches to Resource Management. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-351-57370-2.

• Tan, Kenneth Paul (2016). Governing Global-City Singapore: Legacies and Futures After Lee Kuan Yew. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-317-22443-3.

• Trifonas, Peter Pericles (2018). "Technocracy, Education, and the Global Imperative". In Carr, Paul R.; Hoechsmann, Michael; Thésée, Gina (eds.). Democracy 2.0: Media, Political Literacy and Critical Engagement. Brill. pp. 3–12. ISBN 978-94-6351-230-5.

• Valbruzzi, Marco (2020). "Technocratic Cabinets". In Bertsou, Eri; Caramani, Daniele (eds.). The Technocratic Challenge to Democracy. Routledge. pp. 113–130. ISBN 978-1-000-04360-0.

• Visser, Eva (2026). "Planning the Technate: The Apolitical Politics of the 1930s' Technocratic Movement in North America and Europe". In Veen, Adriejan van; Jung, Theo (eds.). Depoliticisation before Neoliberalism: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political in Modern Europe. Springer Nature. pp. 201–228. ISBN 978-3-031-74101-2.

• Waldron, Jeremy (1998). "Liberalism". In Craig, Edward (ed.). Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780415249126-S035-1. ISBN 978-0-415-07310-3.

• Wilson, Harlan (2008). "Technocrat". International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (2nd ed.). Macmillan Reference. ISBN 978-0-02-866117-9.

External links

• Wikiquote has quotations related to Technocracy.

  Wikimedia Commons has media related to Technocracy.

  Technocracy by William Henry Smyth public domain audiobook at LibriVox

• Technocracy: An Alternative Social System – Arvid Peterson – (1980) on YouTube

• Technocracy: An Interpretation Technocracy: An Interpretation by Stuart Chase

• Technocracy and Socialism, by Paul Blanshard.

• Technocracy Parts I-IV., Working Explosively, A Protest Against Mechanistic Efficiency. Working Explosively Versus Working Efficiently by William Henry Smyth.

• Technocracy Study Course Unabridged by Marion King Hubbert, Howard Scott, Technocracy Inc.,

-Wiki-

…..

Notes.

Basis and Background Artcles and Essays for these Notes:

- How the unthinkable became thinkable.

- Eric Lander, Julian Huxley – The awakening of sleeping monsters. Eric Lander (Eric Steven Lander (born February 3, 1957) is an American mathematician and geneticist who served as the 11th director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy and Science Advisor to the President, serving on the Cabinet in both capacities. Institutions: Broad Institute, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

• Education: Princeton University (AB), Wolfson College, Oxford (MS, Dphil).

  Julian Huxley. (22 June 1887 – 14 February 1975) was an English evolutionary biologist, eugenicist, and internationalist. He was a proponent of natural selection, and a leading figure in the mid-twentieth century modern synthesis. He was secretary of the Zoological Society of London (1935–1942), the first Director of UNESCO, a founding member of the World Wildlife Fund, the president of the British Eugenics Society (1959-1962), and the first President of the British Humanist Association.

- Eugenics; The Fourth Industrial Revolution.

- The Clash of two systems

- From Russel and Hilbert to Weiner and Harari. The Disturbing Origins of Cybernethics and Transhumanism.

Bertrand Arthur William Russell, 3rd Earl Russell OM FRS[66] (18 May 1872 – 2 February 1970) was a British philosopher and polymath. As an academic, he worked in philosophy, mathematics, and logic. His work has had a considerable influence on mathematics, logic, set theory, linguistics, artificial intelligence, cognitive science, computer science, and various areas of analytic philosophy, especially philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of language, epistemology, and metaphysics. He was a public intellectual, historian, social critic, political activist, and Nobel laureate.[67][68] He was born in Monmouthshire into one of the most prominent aristocratic families in the United Kingdom.

Russell was one of the early 20th century's most prominent logicians,[68] and one of the founders of analytic philosophy, along with his predecessor Gottlob Frege, his friend and colleague G. E. Moore and his student and protégé Ludwig Wittgenstein. Russell with Moore led the British "revolt against idealism".[b] Together with his former teacher A. N. Whitehead, Russell wrote Principia Mathematica, a milestone in the development of classical logic, and a major attempt to reduce the whole of mathematics to logic (see Logicism). Russell's article "On Denoting" has been considered a "paradigm of philosophy".[70]

Russell was a pacifist who championed anti-imperialism and chaired the India League.[71][72][73] He occasionally advocated preventive nuclear war, before the opportunity provided by the atomic monopoly had passed and he decided he would "welcome with enthusiasm" world government.[74] He went to prison for his pacifism during World War I.[75] Later, Russell concluded that the war against Adolf Hitler's Nazi Germany was a necessary "lesser of two evils" and also criticized Stalinist totalitarianism, condemned the involvement of the United States in the Vietnam War and was an outspoken proponent of nuclear disarmament.[76] In 1950, Russell was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature "in recognition of his varied and significant writings in which he champions humanitarian ideals and freedom of thought".[77][78] He was also the recipient of the De Morgan Medal (1932), Sylvester Medal (1934), Kalinga Prize (1957), and Jerusalem Prize (1963).

David Hilbert (/ˈhɪlbərt/;[4] German: [ˈdaːvɪt ˈhɪlbɐt]; 23 January 1862 – 14 February 1943) was a German mathematician and one of the most influential mathematicians of the 19th and early 20th centuries. Hilbert discovered and developed a broad range of fundamental ideas in many areas, including invariant theory, the calculus of variations, commutative algebra, algebraic number theory, the foundations of geometry, spectral theory of operators and its application to integral equations, mathematical physics, and the foundations of mathematics (particularly proof theory).

Hilbert adopted and defended Georg Cantor's set theory and transfinite numbers. In 1900, he presented a collection of problems that set the course for much of the mathematical research of the 20th century.[5][6]

Hilbert and his students contributed significantly to establishing rigor and developed important tools used in modern mathematical physics. Hilbert is known as one of the founders of proof theory and mathematical logic.[7]

Norbert Wiener (November 26, 1894 – March 18, 1964) was an American mathematician and philosopher. He was a professor of mathematics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). A child prodigy, Wiener later became an early researcher in stochastic and mathematical noise processes, contributing work relevant to electronic engineering, electronic communication, and control systems.

Wiener is considered the originator of cybernetics, the science of communication as it relates to living things and machines,[3] with implications for engineering, systems control, computer science, biology, neuroscience, philosophy, and the organization of society.

Norbert Wiener is credited as being one of the first to theorize that all intelligent behavior was the result of feedback mechanisms, that could possibly be simulated by machines and was an important early step towards the development of modern artificial intelligence.[4]

Yuval Noah Harari (Hebrew: יובל נח הררי [juˈval ˈnoaχ haˈʁaʁi]; born 1976) is an Israeli public intellectual, historian and a professor in the Department of History at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.[1] He is the author of Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind (2014), Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow (2016), and 21 Lessons for the 21st Century (2018). His writings examine free will, consciousness, intelligence, happiness and suffering.

Harari writes about the "cognitive revolution" occurring roughly 70,000 years ago when Homo sapiens supplanted the rival Neanderthals and other species of the genus Homo, developed language skills and structured societies, and ascended as apex predators, aided by the agricultural revolution and accelerated by the scientific revolution, which have allowed humans to approach near mastery over their environment. His books also examine the possible consequences of a futuristic biotechnological world in which intelligent biological organisms are surpassed by their own creations; he has said, "Homo sapiens as we know them will disappear in a century or so".[2]

In Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind, Harari surveys human history from the evolutionary emergence of Homo Sapiens to 21st Century political and technological revolutions. The book is based on his lectures to an undergraduate world history class.

Literary career[edit]

Harari has published numerous books and articles, including Special Operations in the Age of Chivalry, 1100–1550;[9] The Ultimate Experience: Battlefield Revelations and the Making of Modern War Culture, 1450–2000;[10] The Concept of 'Decisive Battles' in World History;[11] and Armchairs, Coffee and Authority: Eye-witnesses and Flesh-witnesses Speak about War, 1100–2000.[12] He now specializes in world history and macro-historical processes.

His book Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind was originally published in Hebrew in 2011 based on the 20 lectures of an undergraduate world history class he was teaching. It was then released in English in 2014 and has since been translated into some 45 additional languages.[13] The book surveys the entire length of human history, from the evolution of Homo sapiens in the Stone Age up to the political and technological revolutions of the 21st century. The Hebrew edition became a bestseller in Israel, and generated much interest among the general public, turning Harari into a celebrity.[14] Joseph Drew wrote that "Sapiens provides a wide-ranging and thought-provoking introduction for students of comparative civilization," considering it as a work that "highlights the importance and wide expanse of the social sciences."[15]

Harari's follow-up book, Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow, was published in 2016 and examines the possibilities for the future of Homo sapiens.[16] The book's premise outlines that, in the future, humanity is likely to make a significant attempt to gain happiness, immortality and God-like powers.[17] The book goes on to openly speculate various ways this ambition might be realised for Homo sapiens in the future based on the past and present. Among several possibilities for the future, Harari develops the term dataism for a philosophy or mindset that worships big data.[18][19] Writing in The New York Times Book Review, Siddhartha Mukherjee stated that although the book "fails to convince me entirely," he considers it "essential reading for those who think about the future."[20]

His latest book, 21 Lessons for the 21st Century, published on 30 August 2018, focuses more on present-day concerns.[21][22][23][24] A review in the New Statesman commented on what it called "risible moral dictums littered throughout the text", criticised Harari's writing style and stated that he was "trafficking in pointless asides and excruciating banalities."[25] Another review in Kirkus Reviews praised the book as a "tour de force" and described it as a "highly instructive exploration of current affairs and the immediate future of human societies."[26]

The first volume of his graphic adaptation of Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind, Sapiens: A Graphic History – The Birth of Humankind, co-authored with David Vandermeulen and Daniel Casanave, was published in November 2020 and launched at a livestream event organised by How to Academy and Penguin Books.[27]

Views and opinions[edit]

Harari is also interested in how Homo sapiens reached its current condition and in its future. His research focuses on macro-historical questions, such as "What is the relation between history and biology? What is the essential difference between Homo sapiens and other animals? Is there justice in history? Does history have a direction? Did people become happier as history unfolded?"

Harari regards dissatisfaction as the "deep root" of human reality, and as related to evolution.[28]

In a 2017 article, Harari argued that through continuing technological progress and advances in the field of artificial intelligence, "by 2050 a new class of people might emerge – the useless class. People who are not just unemployed, but unemployable."[29] He put forward the case that dealing with this new social class economically, socially and politically will be a central challenge for humanity in the coming decades.[30]

Harari sees an existential threat in an arms race in artificial intelligence and bioengineering and he expressed the need for close co-operation between nations to solve threats like ecological collapse, nuclear war and technological disruption.[31]

Harari has commented on the plight of animals, particularly domesticated animals since the agricultural revolution, and is a vegan.[4] In a 2015 Guardian article under the title "Industrial farming is one of the worst crimes in history" he called "[t]he fate of industrially farmed animals [...] one of the most pressing ethical questions of our time."[32]

Harari summed up his views on the world in a 2018 interview with Steve Paulson of Nautilus thus: "Things are better than ever before. Things are still quite bad. Things can get much worse. This adds up to a somewhat optimistic view because if you realize things are better than before, this means we can make them even better."[33]

Harari wrote that although the idea of free will and the liberal values based upon it "emboldened people who had to fight against the Inquisition, the divine right of kings, the KGB and the KKK", it has become dangerous in a world of a data economy, where, he argues, in reality, there is no such thing, and governments and corporations are coming to know the individual better than they know themselves and "if governments and corporations succeed in hacking the human animal, the easiest people to manipulate will be those who believe in free will."[34] Harari elaborates that "Humans certainly have a will – but it isn't free. You cannot decide what desires you have... Every choice depends on a lot of biological, social and personal conditions that you cannot determine for yourself. I can choose what to eat, whom to marry and whom to vote for, but these choices are determined in part by my genes, my biochemistry, my gender, my family background, my national culture, etc – and I didn't choose which genes or family to have."[34]

In this Era we encounter the disturbing Origins of Cybernetics and Transhumanism merging with old and new ideologies of the concept of Eugenics. These concepts represents a philosophical underpinning and a foundation for the Elite projects of today adhearing to what is seen on the world stage such as; "The Fourth Industrial Revolution", "The Great Reset", "Build Back Better", "The New World Order", "New Technocracy" and the United Nations "Agenda 2030". During the 20:th century powerful special interest groups created, regulated and directed markets, trade and finance birthing Corporations that grew to Globalist mega Corporations and conglomerates. These special Interests also created International institutions (ex: United Nations, Unesco, World Health Organisation, World Bank, World Economic Forum..etc.), Non Governmental Organizations, Foundations and Think Thanks to override national democratic reach and influences. Who and what structures and ideological bodies and heritage informs and influence these powers and what is their goals ? Are these Global wide scaled Policies to be followed and obeyed by a world population whithout any voice of their own ? What is to be said about this development and where does it take humanity ?

After Operation "Paperclip" and Operation "Ossoawiachim", is it now time to finally win the world war 2, 76 years later ? We where all told, and society, politics and education where all organized and aligned with the notion that Fascism came to a definite end 1945. The Allied forces won and the Fascists lost and where delt with accordingly. That was in reality not the case.

At the Nuremberg trials there where actually very few number of entities held to account. It was a rigged trial in more than one aspect. The Nazis had gathered a vast compilation of compromising intelligence material on allied politicians, Royals, high ranking military officers, administrators and activities. Furthermore, the Nazis had developed, for that time, a scientific and technological advantage with several offshoot divisions and scientific projects (Rocket technique, flying aircraft technique and cooperations-Antarctica). This put together resulted in major leverage towards the Allied and their ambition to manifest war crime accountability. The Allies knew, going in to those trials, that it would be a staged event for the world press. At the same time, the OSS (Office of Strategic Services) and the USA had a self interest in trying to bridge the Nazi technology gap and acquire those advantages themselves. So, in internal circles, it is often commented that "the Allied won the battle, but not the war". The war continued with the import of the know-how, the intelligence and the leading Nazi-scientists to, mainly USA and Russia, where they where given free hands to continue their technological research and development. In the US, the Nazi scientist led departments in the newly created CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) and they where set up as private entities detached from federal governance. They where even administering the modernised FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation).

The CIA and NASA where detached organizations, or corporations, with global reach and their influence would be that of changing the outcome of the world direction. Through the CIA, the Deep State organized itself on a Global stage and having control over the Money printing they went on to the world expanding corruption, creating wars and false flags, undermining and changing parliaments and governments (many of them democratic) towards submission and taking over the Global mafia drug- and human trafficking trades turning it into the most profital global corporation in the world.

Knowing that the same economic and financial influencers are repeating their modus operandi whith clockwork intervals in order to accumulate more and more of the world resources, thereby creating the incitaments for almost every war we can remember, we will focus specifically on the world war 2 scenario. The causes of WW2 had its origins in the major financial institutions of that time. The City of London Actors, The Wall Street Actors. The same financiers that had put Benito Mussolini on Time Magazines cover 8 times as "the economic miracle solution for the world" before WW2 even started.

Benito Amilcare Andrea Mussolini (Italian: [be.ˈniː.to a.ˈmil.ka.re an.ˈdreː.a mus.so.ˈliː.ni];[1] 29 July 1883 – 28 April 1945) was an Italian politician and journalist who founded and led the National Fascist Party. He was Prime Minister of Italy from the March on Rome in 1922 until his deposition in 1943, and "Duce" of Italian Fascism from the establishment of the Italian Fasces of Combat in 1919 until his execution in 1945 by Italian partisans. As dictator of Italy and principal founder of fascism, Mussolini inspired and supported the international spread of fascist movements during the inter-war period.[2][3][4][5][6]

Mussolini was originally a socialist politician and a journalist at the Avanti! newspaper. In 1912, he became a member of the National Directorate of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI),[7] but he was expelled from the PSI for advocating military intervention in World War I, in opposition to the party's stance on neutrality. In 1914, Mussolini founded a new journal, Il Popolo d'Italia, and served in the Royal Italian Army during the war until he was wounded and discharged in 1917. Mussolini denounced the PSI, his views now centering on Italian nationalism instead of socialism, and later founded the fascist movement which came to oppose egalitarianism[8] and class conflict, instead advocating "revolutionary nationalism" transcending class lines.[9] On 31 October 1922, following the March on Rome (28–30 October), Mussolini was appointed prime minister by King Victor Emmanuel III, becoming the youngest individual to hold the office up to that time. After removing all political opposition through his secret police and outlawing labor strikes,[10] Mussolini and his followers consolidated power through a series of laws that transformed the nation into a one-party dictatorship. Within five years, Mussolini had established dictatorial authority by both legal and illegal means and aspired to create a totalitarian state. In 1929, Mussolini signed the Lateran Treaty with the Holy See to establish Vatican City.

Mussolini's foreign policy aimed to restore the ancient grandeur of the Roman Empire by expanding Italian colonial possessions and the fascist sphere of influence. In the 1920s, he ordered the Pacification of Libya, instructed the bombing of Corfu over an incident with Greece, established a protectorate over Albania, and incorporated the city of Fiume into the Italian state via agreements with Yugoslavia. In 1936, Ethiopia was conquered following the Second Italo–Ethiopian War and merged into Italian East Africa (AOI) with Eritrea and Somalia. In 1939, Italian forces annexed Albania. Between 1936 and 1939, Mussolini ordered the successful Italian military intervention in Spain in favor of Francisco Franco during the Spanish civil war. Mussolini's Italy initially tried to avoid the outbreak of a second global war, sending troops at the Brenner Pass to delay Anschluss and taking part in the Stresa front, the Lytton Report, the Treaty of Lausanne, the Four-Power Pact and the Munich Agreement. However, Italy then alienated itself from Britain and France by aligning with Germany and Japan. Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939, resulting in declarations of war by France and the UK and the start of World War II.

On 10 June 1940, Mussolini decided to enter the war on the Axis side. Despite initial success, the subsequent Axis collapse on multiple fronts and eventual Allied invasion of Sicily made Mussolini lose the support of the population and members of the Fascist Party. As a consequence, early on 25 July 1943, the Grand Council of Fascism passed a motion of no confidence in Mussolini; later that day King Victor Emmanuel III dismissed him as head of government and had him placed in custody, appointing Pietro Badoglio to succeed him as Prime Minister. After the king agreed to an armistice with the Allies, on 12 September 1943 Mussolini was rescued from captivity in the Gran Sasso raid by German paratroopers and Waffen-SS commandos led by Major Otto-Harald Mors. Hitler, after meeting with the rescued former dictator, then put Mussolini in charge of a puppet regime in northern Italy, the Italian Social Republic (Italian: Repubblica Sociale Italiana, RSI),[11] informally known as the Salò Republic, causing a civil war. In late April 1945, in the wake of near total defeat, Mussolini and his mistress Clara Petacci attempted to flee to Switzerland,[12] but both were captured by Italian communist partisans and summarily executed by firing squad on 28 April 1945 near Lake Como. The bodies of Mussolini and his mistress were then taken to Milan, where they were hung upside down at a service station to publicly confirm their demise.[13]

These financial forces, including people like Prescott Bush and the entire nexus of the financiers, the Brown Brothers Harriman & CO, the Union Banking Corporation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Wallenberg family Corporations, the creators and the profiteers of the war. These groups and individuals where never punished in Nuremberg. They actually created more foundations after the WW2 and reorganized themselves to create the environment for and ignite the start of the Cold War.

-(Matthew Ehret: Technocracy´s Seeds of Transhumanism - 4:27 min)-

.....